Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102585zbMath1485.91050arXiv2005.07997OpenAlexW3208596994MaRDI QIDQ2668980

Florian Brandl, Dominik Peters, Warut Suksompong, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Christian Stricker

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.07997

zbMATH Keywords

public goods provisioncollective decision makingparticipation incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency

Cites Work

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