On the implementation of the median
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Publication:2668985
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102595zbMath1485.91053OpenAlexW3214642633MaRDI QIDQ2668985
Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris, Carlos González Pimienta
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03498557/file/JME_revision%20%284%29.pdf
strategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencesrobust implementationNash implementationBayesian implementationMedian rule
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Cites Work
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