Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
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Publication:2668990
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102613zbMath1485.91085OpenAlexW3217425346MaRDI QIDQ2668990
María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena, Matteo Triossi
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3747871
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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