Horizon-\(K\) farsightedness in criminal networks

DOI10.3390/g12030056zbMath1485.91185OpenAlexW4206118905MaRDI QIDQ2669078

Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030056

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycriminal networkslimited farsightedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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