Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities

DOI10.3390/g12030061zbMath1484.91113arXiv2012.00952OpenAlexW3189030512MaRDI QIDQ2669086

Achilleas Anastasopoulos, Xupeng Wei

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.00952

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdemand managementmechanism designlearning in gamesenergy networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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