The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures

DOI10.3390/g12040076zbMath1484.91157OpenAlexW3205886748MaRDI QIDQ2669117

Marina Bannikova, Artyom Jelnov, Pavel Jelnov

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040076

zbMATH Keywords

votinglegislaturepartieslobbyist

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Why not proportional?
• Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
• Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions

This page was built for publication: The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures