Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents

DOI10.3390/g12040077zbMath1484.91257OpenAlexW3208525692WikidataQ115783316 ScholiaQ115783316MaRDI QIDQ2669118

Roberto Sarkisian

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040077

zbMATH Keywords

screeningaltruismhomo moralis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Evolution and Kantian morality
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
• Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences: which team to choose?
• Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

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