The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
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Publication:2669120
DOI10.3390/g12040079zbMath1484.91168OpenAlexW3210343561MaRDI QIDQ2669120
Publication date: 9 March 2022
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040079
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