Why is civil conflict path dependent? A cultural explanation

DOI10.3390/G12040093zbMath1484.91047OpenAlexW4200247048MaRDI QIDQ2669147

Atin Basuchoudhary

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040093

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypath dependencecivil conflictcivil war persistencelength of civil wars

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Validating game-theoretic models of terrorism: insights from machine learning
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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