Salience bias and overwork

DOI10.3390/g13010015zbMath1484.91256OpenAlexW4210275423MaRDI QIDQ2669175

Fabian Herweg, Fabio Römeis, Daniel Müller

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010015

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardhidden actionsalience theorycontext-dependent preferencesoverwork

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

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