Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner
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Publication:2670475
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2021.12.008OpenAlexW4200286319MaRDI QIDQ2670475
George Gilliam, Nelson A. Uhan
Publication date: 11 March 2022
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.12.008
Uses Software
Cites Work
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