A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.006OpenAlexW4206768871MaRDI QIDQ2670487

Gen-Jiu Xu, René van den Brink, Wen-Zhong Li

Publication date: 11 March 2022

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationsymmetricefficientand linear values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Cites Work

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• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
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• Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

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