On the Shapley value of liability games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.012zbMath1495.91010OpenAlexW3005088290MaRDI QIDQ2670595

Tamás Solymosi, Péter Csóka, Ferenc Illés

Publication date: 11 March 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.012

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryShapley valueinsolvencyconstant-sum gameliability game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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