Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
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Publication:267078
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8zbMath1388.91050OpenAlexW2268154312MaRDI QIDQ267078
Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges
Publication date: 8 April 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8
Related Items (3)
Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games ⋮ Sender-receiver games with cooperation
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