Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8zbMath1388.91050OpenAlexW2268154312MaRDI QIDQ267078

Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges

Publication date: 8 April 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative solutionprivate informationcommitmentfolk theoremjoint plan equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games ⋮ Sender-receiver games with cooperation

Cites Work

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