Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0492-8zbMath1388.91103OpenAlexW1937567131MaRDI QIDQ267081

Ram Orzach, Ezra Einy, Aner Sela, Ori Haimanko

Publication date: 8 April 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1402.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbid capscommon-value all-pay auctionsinformation advantage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Common-value contests with asymmetric information ⋮ On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry

Cites Work

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