Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals

DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5zbMath1388.91052OpenAlexW1204918052MaRDI QIDQ267085

Min Liu, John Hillas

Publication date: 8 April 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0495-5

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumstochastic signalsimperfect monitoringtwo player repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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