Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
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Publication:267090
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0502-XzbMath1388.91042OpenAlexW2254415484WikidataQ59438391 ScholiaQ59438391MaRDI QIDQ267090
Jeroen Kuipers, Gijs Schoenmakers, Janos Flesch
Publication date: 8 April 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0502-x
Related Items (4)
Parameterized games of perfect information ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games ⋮ Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
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