Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_3zbMath1498.91201arXiv2107.08806OpenAlexW3203145828MaRDI QIDQ2670904

Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ameer Amer

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.08806

zbMATH Keywords

welfare maximizationbinary signals2-approximation to optimal welfareex post incentive compatible and individually rational mechanismmatroid auction settingrandomized mechanism design for interdependent valuessubmodular valuation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values ⋮ Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations

Cites Work

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• Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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