Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_4zbMath1492.91079arXiv2007.06304OpenAlexW3202589665MaRDI QIDQ2670905

Alexandros A. Voudouris, Aris Filos-Ratsikas

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06304

zbMATH Keywords

distortionfacility locationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (6)

Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources ⋮ Tight distortion bounds for distributed metric voting on a line ⋮ On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location ⋮ Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice ⋮ The distortion of distributed metric social choice ⋮ The distortion of distributed metric social choice

Cites Work

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• Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences
• Obnoxious Facility Game with a Bounded Service Range
• Mechanisms for Obnoxious Facility Game on a Path
• Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing L_p Norm of Costs
• The distortion of distributed voting

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