Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5zbMath1492.91145arXiv2107.09247OpenAlexW3204640143MaRDI QIDQ2670908

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin, Rishi Patel

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09247

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesclock auctionsobvious ex-post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation ⋮ Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
• Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
• Communications to the Editor—Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

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