Incentive compatible mechanism for influential agent selection

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_6zbMath1492.91080arXiv2107.10612OpenAlexW3203133270MaRDI QIDQ2670910

Xiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10612

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designincentive compatibilityinfluence approximation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Optimal impartial correspondences

Cites Work

• Efficient and effective influence maximization in social networks: a hybrid-approach
• Optimal Impartial Selection
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees
• Unnamed Item

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