Optimal revenue guarantees for pricing in large markets
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Publication:2670927
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_15zbMath1491.91078arXiv2108.04505OpenAlexW3204184088MaRDI QIDQ2670927
José R. Correa, Dana Pizarro, Víctor Verdugo
Publication date: 1 June 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.04505
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