Cost sharing in two-sided markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_17zbMath1492.91157arXiv1809.02718OpenAlexW3202945820MaRDI QIDQ2670930

Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Ali Shameli

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.02718

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcost sharingtwo-sided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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