The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_18OpenAlexW3202289785MaRDI QIDQ2670931

Michael D. McKay, David F. Manlove

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04368

zbMATH Keywords

complexitystable matchingcoalition formationhedonic gamesstable roommatesthree dimensional roommates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Related Items (1)

Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation

Cites Work

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• Hedonic Games
• Approximation algorithms and hardness results for the clique packing problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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