Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
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Publication:2670933
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_19zbMath1490.91144arXiv2007.15748OpenAlexW3203116554MaRDI QIDQ2670933
Adrian Vetta, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Serguei Norine
Publication date: 1 June 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.15748
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