When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_22zbMath1492.91156OpenAlexW3200309221MaRDI QIDQ2670938

Martin Hoefer, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin, Marco Schmalhofer

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_22

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Cites Work

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