Two birds with one stone: fairness and welfare via transfers
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Publication:2670942
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_25zbMath1492.91161arXiv2106.00841OpenAlexW3201903812MaRDI QIDQ2670942
Adrian Vetta, Mashbat Suzuki, Vishnu V. Narayan
Publication date: 1 June 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.00841
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