Two birds with one stone: fairness and welfare via transfers

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_25zbMath1492.91161arXiv2106.00841OpenAlexW3201903812MaRDI QIDQ2670942

Adrian Vetta, Mashbat Suzuki, Vishnu V. Narayan

Publication date: 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.00841

zbMATH Keywords

transfersfair divisionwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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