On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0510-XzbMath1388.91062OpenAlexW2197388774MaRDI QIDQ267101

Dov Samet

Publication date: 8 April 2016

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0510-x

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgeperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• On the centipede game
• On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Unnamed Item

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