Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.004zbMath1492.91053OpenAlexW2921499785MaRDI QIDQ2673209

Marieke Pahlke

Publication date: 9 June 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29304923

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityimprecise informationmultiple priorsdynamic consistencysequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Ambiguity, Learning, and Asset Returns
• Dynamic choice under ambiguity
• Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity

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