Parallel markets in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.03.003zbMath1492.91223OpenAlexW4220918149MaRDI QIDQ2673220

Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Bertan Turhan

Publication date: 9 June 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryinformation acquisitionmatching marketslab experimentdeferred acceptance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (1)

Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice

Cites Work

• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
• Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
• Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Gradual college admission
• Manipulability in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?]
• Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
• School choice: an experimental study
• Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible

This page was built for publication: Parallel markets in school choice