Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.02.032OpenAlexW4213009794WikidataQ114184333 ScholiaQ114184333MaRDI QIDQ2673594

Moshe Haviv, Tzvi Alon

Publication date: 10 June 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.032

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties
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• The concert queueing game: strategic arrivals with waiting and tardiness costs
• Auctions with a random number of identical bidders
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• Joining a queue or staying out: Effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions
• ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals
• Incentives and coordination in bottleneck models
• A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: equilibria simulated by an agent-based model
• Rational Queueing

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