The dynamic edge environment under interactive diversity is a double-edged sword

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2022.127505OpenAlexW4294073703MaRDI QIDQ2673965

Xiaochen Zhu

Publication date: 21 September 2022

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2022.127505

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gamedynamic edge environmentinteractive diversity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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