The perils of friendly oversight

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105500zbMath1498.91125OpenAlexW3173387296MaRDI QIDQ2675405

Edoardo Grillo, Dino Gerardi, Ignacio Monzón

Publication date: 23 September 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105500

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissionmoral hazardpersuasionoversight

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Pivotal persuasion
• The value of recommendations
• Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• A theory of political gridlock
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments

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