Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency
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Publication:2680774
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103809OpenAlexW4307400809MaRDI QIDQ2680774
Jérôme Lang, Ioannis Caragiannis, Haris Aziz, Stéphane Airiau, Dominik Peters, Justin Kruger
Publication date: 4 January 2023
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103809
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