Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models
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Publication:2680788
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103821OpenAlexW4309635285MaRDI QIDQ2680788
Alberto Marchesi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti
Publication date: 4 January 2023
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103821
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