Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
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Publication:2680800
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103825OpenAlexW4309198198MaRDI QIDQ2680800
Takamasa Suzuki, Yuzhe Zhang, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo, Akihisa Tamura
Publication date: 4 January 2023
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103825
deferred acceptancestrategyproofnesstop trading cyclesdistributional constraintsM-convex setcontrolled school choice
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