A theory of progressive lending

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.005OpenAlexW3041319258MaRDI QIDQ2681508

Dyotona Dasgupta, Dilip Mookherjee

Publication date: 3 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddynamic contractsborrowing constraintsmicrofinanceprogressive lending

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
• Contract Structure, Risk-Sharing, and Investment Choice
• Political Economy of Mechanisms
• Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang
• Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements

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