Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932zbMath1506.91006OpenAlexW4300971893MaRDI QIDQ2681816

Gwenaël Piaser, Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni

Publication date: 30 January 2023

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110932

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium existencecompeting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*

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