Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550zbMath1506.91081OpenAlexW4296517788MaRDI QIDQ2682005

Dmitri O. Orlov

Publication date: 31 January 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550

zbMATH Keywords

communicationmonitoringinterventionsdynamic contractsrepeated moral hazardperformance evaluations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Paying with information

Cites Work

• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Persistent Private Information
• Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
• Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Optimal Contracts with Shirking
• Motivational Ratings
• Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard

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