Optimal epidemic control in equilibrium with imperfect testing and enforcement

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105570zbMath1506.92100arXiv2104.04455OpenAlexW3174758075MaRDI QIDQ2682017

Alexis Akira Toda, Thomas Phelan

Publication date: 31 January 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.04455

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyquarantineperfect Bayesian equilibriumexternalitieslockdown

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30)

Cites Work

• A mathematical analysis of public avoidance behavior during epidemics using game theory
• Internal and external effects of social distancing in a pandemic
• Public avoidance and epidemics: insights from an economic model
• Stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
• Optimal Quarantine Programmes for Controlling an Epidemic Spread
• Rational Epidemics and Their Public Control
• Integrating Behavioral Choice into Epidemiological Models of AIDS
• RATIONAL DISINHIBITION AND EXTERNALITIES IN PREVENTION
• Discounted Dynamic Programming

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