Global manipulation by local obfuscation
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Publication:2682790
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105575OpenAlexW4308785743MaRDI QIDQ2682790
Mofei Zhao, Fei Li, Yangbo Song
Publication date: 1 February 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105575
Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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