Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.12.004OpenAlexW4313530630MaRDI QIDQ2685827

Cédric Wasser, Mengxi Zhang

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

contestsmechanism designall-pay auctionfavoritismwinner's effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Optimally biased contests with draws

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• An extension of Young's inequality
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• Contest architecture
• DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY
• All-Pay Contests
• Optimal Auction Design

This page was built for publication: Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information