The limits to moral erosion in markets: social norms and the replacement excuse

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.001OpenAlexW4312208371MaRDI QIDQ2685831

Yagiz Özdemir, Björn Bartling

Publication date: 23 February 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

marketscompetitionsocial normsutilitarianismmoral behaviordeontological ethicsreplacement excuse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• oTree
• hroot

Cites Work

• Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
• Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
• Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance
• Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium
• Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
• Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
• A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence

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