The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
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Publication:2685998
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102791zbMath1505.91049OpenAlexW4309796579MaRDI QIDQ2685998
Publication date: 24 February 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102791
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
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