Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences
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Publication:268621
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.007zbMath1368.91066OpenAlexW2226377306MaRDI QIDQ268621
Publication date: 15 April 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01224145/file/15069.pdf
Pareto principlesubjective expected utilityHarsanyi's theoremmonotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences
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