Decentralized pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.008zbMath1368.91133OpenAlexW2233990944MaRDI QIDQ268624

Herbert Gintis, Antoine Mandel

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01296646/file/jmatheconElsartFinal.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygeneral equilibriumevolutionary game theorymarket gamescomputational economics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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