Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.02.005zbMath1368.91026OpenAlexW2288402691MaRDI QIDQ268639

Luís Carvalho, Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 15 April 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/810994/7/SRI_deposit_agreement.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamestwo-person zero-sum games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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