Extreme parties and political rents

DOI10.1515/bejte-2018-0087OpenAlexW3125633114MaRDI QIDQ2688223

R. Emre Aytimur

Publication date: 2 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0087

zbMATH Keywords

electoral competitionproportional representation systemrent-seeking political parties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

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• Elections with platform and valence competition
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• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
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• Electoral platforms, implemented policies, and abstention
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives

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