Signaling games with endogenous types

DOI10.1007/S00182-022-00813-4OpenAlexW4310220228MaRDI QIDQ2689418

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 10 March 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00813-4

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionsignaling gamesstrategic stabilitysingle crossing propertyendogenous typesexogenous typesmonotonic signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control
• Signaling Private Choices
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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