The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game

DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00816-1OpenAlexW4309891828MaRDI QIDQ2689422

Keisuke Bando, Yakuma Furusawa

Publication date: 10 March 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00816-1

zbMATH Keywords

stable setassignment game\(\mu\)-compatible subgames

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
• A survey on assignment markets
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• Assignment games with stable core
• A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
• A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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